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ABSTRACT
We introduce a new black-box attack achieving state of the art performances. Our
approach is based on a new objective function, borrowing ideas from `∞-white
box attacks, and particularly designed to fit derivative-free optimization require-
ments. It only requires to have access to the logits of the classifier without any
other information which is a more realistic scenario. Not only we introduce a new
objective function, we extend previous works on black box adversarial attacks
to a larger spectrum of evolution strategies and other derivative-free optimization
methods. We also highlight a new intriguing property that deep neural networks
are not robust to single shot tiled attacks. Our models achieve, with a budget lim-
ited to 10, 000 queries, results up to 99.2% of success rate against InceptionV3
classifier with 630 queries to the network on average in the untargeted attacks set-
ting, which is an improvement by 90 queries of the current state of the art. In the
targeted setting, we are able to reach, with a limited budget of 100, 000, 100% of
success rate with a budget of 6, 662 queries on average, i.e. we need 800 queries
less than the current state of the art.
1 INTRODUCTION
Despite their success, deep learning algorithms have shown vulnerability to adversarial attacks (Big-
gio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2014), i.e. small imperceptible perturbations of the inputs, that lead
the networks to misclassify the generated adversarial examples. Since their discovery, adversarial
attacks and defenses have become one of the hottest research topics in the machine learning commu-
nity as serious security issues are raised in many critical fields. They also question our understanding
of deep learning behaviors. Although some advances have been made to explain theoretically (Fawzi
et al., 2016; Sinha et al., 2017; Cohen et al., 2019; Pinot et al., 2019) and experimentally (Good-
fellow et al., 2015; Xie et al., 2018; Meng & Chen, 2017; Samangouei et al., 2018; Araujo et al.,
2019) adversarial attacks, the phenomenon remains misunderstood and there is still a gap to come
up with principled guarantees on the robustness of neural networks against maliciously crafted at-
tacks. Designing new and stronger attacks helps building better defenses, hence the motivation of
our work.
First attacks were generated in a setting where the attacker knows all the information of the network
(architecture and parameters). In this white box setting, the main idea is to perturb the input in
the direction of the gradient of the loss w.r.t. the input (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al.,
2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). This case is unrealistic because
the attacker has only limited access to the network in practice. For instance, web services that
propose commercial recognition systems such as Amazon or Google are backed by pretrained neural
networks. A user can query this system by sending an image to classify. For such a query, the user
only has access to the inference results of the classifier which might be either the label, probabilities
or logits. Such a setting is coined in the literature as the black box setting. It is more realistic but
also more challenging from the attacker’s standpoint.
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As a consequence, several works proposed black box attacks by just querying the inference results
of a given classifier. A natural way consists in exploiting the transferability of an adversarial attack,
based on the idea that if an example fools a classifier, it is more likely that it fools another one (Pa-
pernot et al., 2016a). In this case, a white box attack is crafted on a fully known classifier. Papernot
et al. (2017) exploited this property to derive practical black box attacks. Another approach within
the black box setting consists in estimating the gradient of the loss by querying the classifier (Chen
et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018a;b). For these attacks, the PGD attack (Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry
et al., 2018a) algorithm is used and the gradient is replaced by its estimation.
In this paper, we propose efficient black box adversarial attacks using stochastic derivative free
optimization (DFO) methods with only access to the logits of the classifier. By efficient, we mean
that our model requires a limited number of queries while outperforming the state of the art in terms
of attack success rate. At the very core of our approach is a new objective function particularly
designed to suit classical derivative free optimization. We also highlight a new intriguing property
that deep neural networks are not robust to single shot tiled attacks. It leverages results and ideas
from `∞-attacks. We also explore a large spectrum of evolution strategies and other derivative-free
optimization methods thanks to the Nevergrad framework (Rapin & Teytaud, 2018).
Outline of the paper. We present in Section 2 the related work on adversarial attacks. Section 3
presents the core of our approach. We introduce a new generic objective function and discuss two
practical instantiations leading to a discrete and a continuous optimization problems. We then give
more details on the best performing derivative-free optimization methods, and provide some insights
on our models and optimization strategies. Section 4 is dedicated to a thorough experimental analy-
sis, where we show we reach state of the art performances by comparing our models with the most
powerful black-box approaches on both targeted and untargeted attacks. We also assess our models
against the most efficient so far defense strategy based on adversarial training. We finally conclude
our paper in Section 5.
2 RELATED WORK
Adversarial attacks have a long standing history in the machine learning community. Early works
appeared in the mid 2000’s where the authors were concerned about Spam classification (Biggio
et al., 2009). Szegedy et al. (2014) revives this research topic by highlighting that deep convolu-
tional networks can be easily fooled. Many adversarial attacks against deep neural networks have
been proposed since then. One can distinguish two classes of attacks: white box and black box
attacks. In the white box setting, the adversary is supposed to have full knowledge of the network
(architecture and parameters), while in the black box one, the adversary only has limited access to
the network: she does not know the architecture, and can only query the network and gets labels,
logits or probabilities from her queries. An attack is said to have suceeded (we also talk about Attack
Success Rate), if the input was originally well classified and the generated example is classified to
the targeted label.
The white box setting attracted more attention even if it is the more unrealistic between the two.
The attacks are crafted by by back-propagating the gradient of the loss function w.r.t. the input. The
problem writes as a non-convex optimization procedure that either constraints the perturbation or
aims at minimizing its norm. Among the most popular ones, one can cite FGSM (Goodfellow et al.,
2015), PGD (Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2018a), Deepfool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016),
JSMA (Papernot et al., 2016b), Carlini&Wagner attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) and EAD (Chen
et al., 2018).
The black box setting is more realistic, but also more challenging. Two strategies emerged in the
literature to craft attacks within this setting: transferability from a substitute network, and gradient
estimation algorithms. Transferability has been pointed out by Papernot et al. (2017). It consists in
generating a white-box adversarial example on a fully known substitute neural network, i.e. a net-
work trained on the same classification task. This crafted adversarial example can be transferred to
the targeted unknown network. Leveraging this property, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2017) proposed
an algorithm to craft a single adversarial attack that is the same for all examples and all networks.
Despite the popularity of these methods, gradient estimation algorithms outperform transferability
methods. Chen et al. (2017) proposed a variant of the powerful white-box attack introduced in (Car-
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lini & Wagner, 2017), based on gradient estimation with finite differences. This method achieves
good results in practice but requires a high number of queries to the network. To reduce the number
of queries, Ilyas et al. (2018a) proposed to rely rather on Natural Evolution Strategies (NES). These
derivative-free optimization approaches consist in estimating the parametric distribution of the min-
ima of a given objective function. This amounts for most of NES algorithms to perform a natural
gradient descent in the space of distributions (Ollivier et al., 2017). In (Al-Dujaili & O’Reilly,
2019), the authors propose to rather estimate the sign of the gradient instead of estimating the its
magnitude suing zeroth-order optimization techniques. They show further how to reduce the search
space from exponential to linear. The achieved results were state of the art at the publication date.
In Liu et al. (2019), the authors introduced a zeroth-order version of the signSGD algorithm, stud-
ied its convergence properties and showed its efficiency in crafting adversarial black-box attacks.
The results are promising but fail to beat the state of the art. In Tu et al. (2019), the authors intro-
duce the AutoZOOM framework combining gradient estimation and an auto-encoder trained offline
with unlabeled data. The idea is appealing but requires training an auto-encoder with an available
dataset, which an additional effort for the attacker. Besides, this may be unrealistic for several use
cases. More recently, Moon et al. (2019) proposed a method based on discrete and combinatorial
optimization where the perturbations are pushed towards the corners of the `∞ ball. This method is
to the best of our knowledge the state of the art in the black box setting in terms of queries budget
and success rate. We will focus in our experiments on this method and show how our approaches
achieve better results.
Several defense strategies have been proposed to diminish the impact of adversarial attacks on net-
works accuracies. A basic workaround, introduced in (Goodfellow et al., 2015), is to augment the
learning set with adversarial attacks examples. Such an approach is called adversarial training in the
literature. It helps recovering some accuracy but fails to fully defend the network, and lacks theoret-
ical guarantees, in particular principled certificates. Defenses based on randomization at inference
time were also proposed (Lecuyer et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Pinot et al., 2019). These meth-
ods are grounded theoretically, but the guarantees cannot ensure full protection against adversarial
examples. The question of defenses and attacks is still widely open since our understanding of this
phenomenon is still in its infancy. We evaluate our approach against adversarial training, the most
powerful defense method so far.
3 METHODS
3.1 GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Let us consider a classification task X 7→ [K] where X ⊆ Rd is the input space and [K] =
{1, ...,K} is the corresponding label set. Let f : Rd → RK be a classifier (a feed forward neu-
ral network in our paper) from an input space X returning the logits of each label in [K] such
that the predicted label for a given input is argmaxi∈[K] fi(x). The aim of ||.||∞-bounded un-
targeted adversarial attacks is, for some input x with label y, to find a perturbation τ such that
argmaxi∈[K] fi(x) 6= y. Classically, ||.||∞-bounded untargeted adversarial attacks aims at optimiz-
ing the following objective:
max
τ :||τ ||∞≤
L(f(x+ τ), y) (1)
where L is a loss function (typically the cross entropy) and y the true label. For targeted attacks,
the attacker targets a label yt by maximizing −L(f(x+ τ), yt). With access to the gradients of the
network, gradient descent methods have proved their efficiency (Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al.,
2018a). So far, the outline of most black box attacks was to estimate the gradient using either finite
differences or natural evolution strategies. Here using evolutionary strategies heuristics, we do not
want to take care of the gradient estimation problem.
3.2 TWO OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
In some DFO approaches, the default search space is Rd. In the `∞ bounded adversarial attacks
setting, the search space isB∞() = {τ : ||τ ||∞ ≤ }. It requires to adapt the problem in Eq 1. Two
variants are proposed in the sequel leading to continuous and discretized versions of the problem.
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The continuous problem. As in Carlini & Wagner (2017), we use the hyperbolic tangent transfor-
mation to restate our problem since B∞() =  tanh (Rd). This leads to a continuous search space
on which evolutionary strategies apply. Hence our optimization problem writes:
max
τ∈Rd
L(f(x+  tanh(τ)), y). (2)
We will call this problem DFOc− optimizer where optimizer is the used black box derivative free
optimization strategy.
The discretized problem. Moon et al. (2019) pointed out that PGD attacks (Kurakin et al., 2016;
Madry et al., 2018b) are mainly located on the corners of the `∞-ball. They consider optimizing the
following
max
τ∈{−,+}d
L(f(x+ τ), y). (3)
The author in (Moon et al., 2019) proposed a purely discrete combinatorial optimization to solve
this problem (Eq. 3). As in Bello et al. (2017), we here consider how to automatically convert an
algorithm designed for continuous optimization to discrete optimization. To make the problem in
Eq. 3 compliant with our evolutionary strategies setting, we rewrite our problem by considering a
stochastic function f(x + τ) where, for all i, τi ∈ {−1,+1} and P(τi = 1) = Softmax(ai, bi) =
eai
eai+ebi
. Hence our problem amounts to find the best parameters ai and bi that optimize:
min
a,b
Eτ∼Pa,b(L(f(x+ τ), y) (4)
We then rely on evolutionary strategies to find the parameters a and b. As the optima are determinis-
tic, the optimal values for a and b are at infinity. Some ES algorithms are well suited to such setting
as will be discussed in the sequel. We will call this problem DFOd− optimizer where optimizer
is the used black box derivative free optimization strategy for a and b. In this case, one could re-
duce the problem to one variale ai with P(τi = 1) = 11+e−ai , but experimentally the results are
comparable, so we concentrate on Problem 4.
3.3 DERIVATIVE-FREE OPTIMIZATION METHODS
Derivative-free optimization methods are aimed at optimizing an objective function without access
to the gradient. There exists a large and wide literature around derivative free optimisation. In this
setting, one algorithm aims to minimize some function f on some space X . The only thing that
could be done by this algorithm is to query for some points x the value of f(x). As evaluating f
can be computationally expensive, the purpose of DFO methods is to get a good approximation of
the optima using a moderate number of queries. We tested several evolution strategies (Rechen-
berg, 1973; Beyer, 2001): the simple (1+ 1)-algorithm (Matyas, 1965; Schumer & Steiglitz, 1968),
Covariance Matrix Adaptation (CMA (Hansen & Ostermeier, 2003)). For these methods, the un-
derlying algorithm is to iteratively update some distribution Pθ defined on X . Roughly speaking,
the current distribution Pθ represents the current belief of the localization of the optimas of the goal
function. The parameters are updated using objective function values at different points. It turns out
that this family of algorithms, than can be reinterpreted as natural evolution strategies, perform best.
The two best performing methods will be detailed in Section 3.3.1; we refer to references above for
other tested methods.
3.3.1 OUR BEST PERFORMING METHODS: EVOLUTION STRATEGIES
The (1 + 1)-ES algorithm. The (1 + 1)-evolution strategy with one-fifth rule (Matyas, 1965;
Schumer & Steiglitz, 1968) is a simple but effective derivative-free optimization algorithm (in sup-
plementary material, Alg. 1). Compared to random search, this algorithm moves the center of the
Gaussian sampling according to the best candidate and adapts its scale by taking into account their
frequency. Yao & Liu (1996) proposed the use of Cauchy distributions instead of classical Gaussian
sampling. This favors large steps, and improves the results in case of (possibly partial) separabil-
ity of the problem, i.e. when it is meaningful to perform large steps in some directions and very
moderate ones in the other directions.
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Tile size: 6 pixels
+ 0.03 x =
Figure 1: Illustration of the tiling trick: the same noise is applied on small tile squares.
CMA-ES algorithm. The Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution Strategy (Hansen & Oster-
meier, 2003) combines evolution strategies (Beyer, 2001), Cumulative Step-Size Adaptation (Arnold
& Beyer, 2004), and a specific method for adaptating the covariance matrix. An outline is provided
in supplementary material, Alg. 2. CMA-ES is an effective and robust algorithm, but it becomes
catastrophically slow in high dimension due to the expensive computation of the square root of the
matrix. As a workaround, Ros & Hansen (2008) propose to approximate the covariance matrix by
a diagonal one. This leads to a computational cost linear in the dimension, rather than the original
quadratic one.
Link with Natural Evolution Strategy (NES) attacks. Both (1+1)-ES and CMA-ES can be seen as
an instantiation of a natural evolution strategy (see for instance Ollivier et al. (2017); Wierstra et al.
(2014)). A natural evolution strategy consists in estimating iteratively the distribution of the optima.
For most NES approaches, a fortiori CMA-ES, the iterative estimation consists in a second-order
gradient descent (also known as natural gradient) in the space of distributions (e.g. Gaussians).
(1+1)-ES can also be seen as a NES, where the covariance matrix is restricted to be proportional
to the identity. Note however that from an algorithmic perspective, both CME-ES and (1+1)-ES
optimize the quantile of the objective function.
3.3.2 HYPOTHESES FOR DFO METHODS IN THE ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS CONTEXT
The state of the art in DFO and intuition suggest the followings. Using softmax for exploring only
points in the corner (Eq. 3) is better for moderate budget, as corners are known to be good adversarial
candidates; however, for high precision attacks (with small τ ) a smooth continuous precision (Eq 2)
is more relevant. With or without softmax, the optimum is at infinity 1, which is in favor of methods
having fast step-size adaptation or samplings with heavy-tail distributions. With an optimum at
infinity, (Chotard et al., 2012) has shown how fast is the adaptation of the step-size when using
cumulative step-size adaptation (as in CMA-ES), as opposed to slower rates for most methods.
Cauchy sampling (Yao & Liu, 1996) in the (1 + 1)-ES is known for favoring fast changes; this is
consistent with the superiority of Cauchy sampling in our setting compared to Gaussian sampling.
Newuoa, Powell, SQP, Bayesian Optimization, Bayesian optimization are present in Nevergrad but
they have an expensive (budget consumption linear is linear w.r.t. the dimension) initial sampling
stage which is not possible in our high-dimensional / moderate budget context. The targeted case
needs more precision and favors algorithms such as Diagonal CMA-ES which adapt a step-size
per coordinate whereas the untargeted case is more in favor of fast random exploration such as the
(1 + 1)-ES. Compared to Diagonal-CMA, CMA with full covariance might be too slow; given a
number of queries (rather than a time budget) it is however optimal for high precision.
3.4 THE TILING TRICK
Ilyas et al. (2018b) suggested to tile the attack to lower the number of queries necessary to fool the
network. Concretely, they observe that the gradient coordinates are correlated for close pixels in the
images, so they suggested to add the same noise for small square tiles in the image (see Fig. 1).
1i.e. the optima of the ball constrained problem 1, would be close to the boundary or on the boundary of
the `∞ ball. In that case, the optimum of the continuous problem 2 will be at∞ or close to it. On the discrete
case 4 it is easy to see that the optimum is when ai or bi →∞.
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Figure 2: Success rate of a single shot random attacks on ImageNet vs. the number of tiles used to
craft the attack. On the left, attacks are plotted against InceptionV3 classifier with different noise
intensities ( ∈ {0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.1}). On the right,  is fixed to 0.05 and the single shot attack is
evaluated on InceptionV3, ResNet50 and VGG16bn.
We exploit the same trick since it reduces the dimensionality of the search space, and makes hence
evolutionary strategies suited to the problem at hand. Besides breaking the curse of dimensionality,
tiling leads surprisingly to a new property that we discovered during our experiments. At a given
tiling scale, convolutional neural networks are not robust to random noise. Section 4.2 is devoted to
this intriguing property. Interestingly enough, initializing our optimization algorithms with a tiled
noise at the appropriate scale drastically speeds up the convergence, leading to a reduced number of
queries.
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 GENERAL SETTING AND IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We compare our approach to the “bandits” method (Ilyas et al., 2018b) and the parsimonious at-
tack (Moon et al., 2019). The latter (parsimonious attack) is, to the best of our knowledge, the
state of the art in the black-box setting from the literature; bandits method is also considered in
our benchmark given its ties to our models. We reproduced the results from (Moon et al., 2019) in
our setting for fair comparison. As explained in section 3.2, our attacks can be interpreted as `∞
ones. We use the large-scale ImageNet dataset (Deng et al., 2009). As usually done in most frame-
works, we quantify our success in terms of attack success rate, median queries and average queries.
Here, the number of queries refers to the number of requests to the output logits of a classifier for
a given image. For the success rate, we only consider the images that were correctly classified by
our model. We use InceptionV3 (Szegedy et al., 2017) , VGG16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014)
with batch normalization (VGG16bn) and ResNet50 (He et al., 2016) architectures to measure the
performance of our algorithm on the ImageNet dataset. These models reach accuracy close to the
the state of the art with around 75 − 80% for the Top-1 accuracy and 95% for the Top-5 accuracy.
We use pretrained models from PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017). All images are normalized to [0, 1].
Results on VGG16bn and ResNet50 are deferred in supplementary material E. The images to be
attacked are selected at random.
We first show that convolutional networks are not robust to tiled random noise, and more sur-
prisingly that there exists an optimal tile size that is the same for all architectures and noise in-
tensities. Then, we evaluate our methods on both targeted and untargeted objectives. We con-
sidered the following losses: the cross entropy L(f(x), y) = − log(P(y|x)) and a loss inspired
from the “Carlini&Wagner” attack: L(f(x), y) = −P(y|x) + maxy′ 6=y P(y′|x) where P(y|x) =
[Softmax(f(x))]y , the probability for the classifier to classify the input x to label y. The results
for the second loss are deferred in supplementary material C. For all our attacks, we use the Never-
grad (Rapin & Teytaud, 2018) implementation of evolution strategies. We did not change the default
parameters of the optimization strategies.
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Figure 3: The cumulative success rate in terms the number of queries for the number of queries
required for attacks on ImageNet with  = 0.05 in the untargeted (left) and targeted setting (right).
The number of queries (x-axis) is plotted with a logarithmic scale.
Table 1: Comparison of our method with the parsimonious and bandits attacks in the untargeted
setting on ImageNet on InceptionV3 pretrained network for  = 0.05 and 10, 000 as budget limit.
Method # of tiles Average queries Median queries Success rate
Parsimonious - 702 222 98.4%
Bandits 30 1007 269 95.3%
Bandits 50 995 249 95.1%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 30 466 60 95.2%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 50 510 63 97.3%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 30 533 189 97.2%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 50 623 191 98.7%
DFOc−CMA 30 589 232 98.9%
DFOc−CMA 50 630 259 99.2%
DFOd−DiagonalCMA 30 424 20 97.7%
DFOd−DiagonalCMA 50 485 38 97.4%
4.2 CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORKS ARE NOT ROBUST TO TILED RANDOM NOISE
In this section, we highlight that neural neural networks are not robust to `∞ tiled random noise. A
noise on an image is said to be tiled if the added noise on the image is the same on small squares
of pixels (see Figure 2). In practice, we divide our image in equally sized tiles. For each tile, we
add to the image a randomly chosen constant noise: + with probability 12 and − with probability
1
2 , uniformly on the tile. The tile trick has been introduced inIlyas et al. (2018a) for dimensionality
reduction. Here we exhibit a new behavior that we discovered during our experiments. As shown
in Fig. 1 for reasonable noise intensity ( = 0.05), the success rate of a one shot randomly tiled
attack is quite high. This fact is observed on many neural network architectures. We compared the
number of tiles since the images input size are not the same for all architectures (299 × 299 × 3
for InceptionV3 and 224 × 224 × 3 for VGG16bn and ResNet50). The optimal number of tiles (in
the sense of attack success rate) is, surprisingly, independent from the architecture and the noise
intensity. We also note that the InceptionV3 architecture is more robust to random tiled noise than
VGG16bn and ResNet50 architectures. InceptionV3 blocks are parallel convolutions with different
filter sizes that are concatenated. Using different filter sizes may attenuate the effect of the tiled noise
since some convolution sizes might be less sensitive. We test this with a single random attack with
various numbers of tiles (cf. Figure 1, 2). We plotted additional graphs in supplementary material B.
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Table 2: Comparison of our method with the parsimonious and bandits attacks in the targeted setting
on ImageNet on InceptionV3 pretrained network for  = 0.05 and 100, 000 as budget limit.
Method # of tiles Average queries Median queries Success rate
Parsimonious - 7184 5116 100%
Bandits 50 25341 18053 92.5%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 50 9789 6049 83.2%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 50 6768 3797 94.0%
DFOc−CMA 50 6662 4692 100%
DFOd−DiagonalCMA 50 8957 4619 64.2%
4.3 UNTARGETED ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
We first evaluate our attacks in the untargeted setting. The aim is to change the predicted label of the
classifier. Following (Moon et al., 2019; Ilyas et al., 2018b), we use 10, 000 images that are initially
correctly classified and we limit the budget to 10, 000 queries. We experimented with 30 and 50 tiles
on the images. Only the best performing methods are reported in Table 1. We compare our results
with (Moon et al., 2019) and (Ilyas et al., 2018b) on InceptionV3 (cf. Table 1). We also plotted the
cumulative success rate in terms of required budget in Figure 3. We also evaluated our attacks for
smaller noise in supplementary material D. We achieve results outperforming or at least equal to the
state of the art in all cases. More remarkably, We improve by far the number of necessary queries
to fool the classifiers. The tiling trick partially explains why the average and the median number of
queries are low. Indeed, the first queries of our evolution strategies is in general close to random
search and hence, according to the observation of Figs 1-2, the first steps are more likely to fool the
network, which explains why the queries budget remains low. This Discrete strategies reach better
median numbers of queries - which is consistent as we directly search on the limits of the `∞-ball;
however, given the restricted search space (only corners of the search space are considered), the
success rate is lower and on average the number of queries increases due to hard cases.
4.4 TARGETED ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
We also evaluate our methods in the targeted case on ImageNet dataset. We selected 1, 000 images,
correctly classified. Since the targeted task is harder than the untargeted case, we set the maximum
budget to 100, 000 queries, and  = 0.05. We uniformly chose the target class among the incorrect
ones. We evaluated our attacks in comparison with the bandits methods (Ilyas et al., 2018b) and the
parsimonious attack (Moon et al., 2019) on InceptionV3 classifier. We also plotted the cumulative
success rate in terms of required budget in Figure 3. CMA-ES beats the state of the art on all criteria.
DiagonalCMA-ES obtains acceptable results but is less powerful that CMA-ES in this specific case.
The classical CMA optimizer is more precise, even if the run time is much longer. Cauchy (1 + 1)-
ES and discretized optimization reach good results, but when the task is more complicated they do
not reach as good results as the state of the art in black box targeted attacks.
4.5 UNTARGETED ATTACKS AGAINST AN ADVERSARIALLY TRAINED NETWORK
In this section, we experiment our attacks against a defended network by adversarial training (Good-
fellow et al., 2015). Since adversarial training is computationally expensive, we restricted ourselves
to the CIFAR10 dataset (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) for this experiment. Image size is 32 × 32 × 3.
We adversarially trained a WideResNet28x10 (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016) with PGD `∞ at-
tacks (Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2018a) of norm 8/256 and 10 steps of size 2/256. In this
setting, we randomly selected 1, 000 images, and limited the budget to 20, 000 queries. We ran PGD
`∞ attacks (Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2018a) of norm 8/256 and 20 steps of size 1/256
against our network, and achieved a success rate up to 36%, which is the the state of the art in the
white box setting. We also compared our method to the Parsimonious and bandit attacks. Results
are reported in Appendix 6. On this task, the parsimonious attack method is slightly better than our
best approach.
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5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new framework for crafting black box adversarial attacks based on
derivative free optimization. Because of the high dimensionality and the characteristics of the prob-
lem (see Section 3.3.2), not all optimization strategies give satisfying results. However, combined
with the tiling trick, evolutionary strategies such as CMA, DiagonalCMA and Cauchy (1+1)-ES
beats the current state of the art in both targeted and untargeted settings. In particular, DFOc−CMA
improves the state of the art in terms of success rate in almost all settings. We also validated the
robustness of our attack against an adversarially trained network. Future work will be devoted to
better understanding the intriguing property of the effect that a neural network is not robust to a one
shot randomly tiled attack.
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A ALGORITHMS
A.1 THE (1+1)-ES ALGORITHM
Algorithm 1 The (1 + 1) Evolution Strategy.
Require: Function f : Rd → R to minimize
m← 0, C ← Id, σ ← 1
for t = 1...n do
(Generate candidates)
Generate m′ ∼ m+ σX where X is sampled from a Cauchy or Gaussian distribution.
if f(m′) ≤ f(m) then
m← m′, σ ← 2σ
else
σ ← 2− 14σ
end if
end for
A.2 CMA-ES ALGORITHM
Algorithm 2 CMA-ES algorithm. The T subscript denotes transposition.
Require: Function f : Rd → R to minimize, parameters b, c, w1 > . . . , wµ > 0, pc and others as
in e.g. (Hansen & Ostermeier, 2003).
m← 0, C ← Id, σ ← 1
for t = 1...n do
Generate x1, ..., xλ ∼ m+ σN (0, C).
Define x′i the i
th best of the xi.
Update the cumulation for C: pc ← cumulation of pc, overall direction of progress.
Update the covariance matrix:
C ← (1− c) C︸︷︷︸
inertia
+
c
b
(pc × pTc )︸ ︷︷ ︸
overall direction
+c(1− 1
b
)
µ∑
i=1
wi
x′i −m
σ
× (x
′
i −m)T
σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
“covariance” of the 1σx
′
i
Update mean:
m←
µ∑
i=1
wixi:λ
Update σ by cumulative step-size adaptation (Arnold & Beyer, 2004).
end for
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B ADDITIONAL PLOTS FOR THE TILING TRICK
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Figure 4: Random attack success rate against InceptionV3 (left), ResNet50 (center), VGG16bn
(right) for different noise intensities. We just randomly draw one tiled attack and check if it is
successful.
0 50 100 150 200
Number of tiles
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
At
ta
ck
 su
cc
es
s r
at
e
Attack success for = 0.01 with different 
 architetures versus the number of tiles
ResNet50
InceptionV3
VGG16bn
0 50 100 150 200
Number of tiles
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
0.150
0.175
0.200
At
ta
ck
 su
cc
es
s r
at
e
Attack success for = 0.03 with different 
 architetures versus the number of tiles
ResNet50
InceptionV3
VGG16bn
0 50 100 150 200
Number of tiles
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
At
ta
ck
 su
cc
es
s r
at
e
Attack success for = 0.05 with different 
 architetures versus the number of tiles
ResNet50
InceptionV3
VGG16bn
0 50 100 150 200
Number of tiles
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
At
ta
ck
 su
cc
es
s r
at
e
Attack success for = 0.1 with different 
 architetures versus the number of tiles
ResNet50
InceptionV3
VGG16bn
Figure 5: Random attack success rate for different noise intensities  ∈ {0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.1} (from
right to left) against different architectures. We just randomly draw one tiled attack and check if it
is successful.
C RESULTS WITH “CARLINI&WAGNER” LOSS
In this section, we follow the same experimental setup as in Section 4.3, but we built our attacks
with the “Carlini&Wagner” loss instead of the cross entropy. We remark the results are comparable
and similar.
Table 3: Comparison of our method with“Carlini&Wagner” loss versus the parsimonious and bandits
attacks in the untargeted setting on InceptionV3 pretrained network for  = 0.05 and 10, 000 as
budget limit.
Method # of tiles Average queries Median queries Success rate
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 30 353 57 97.2%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 50 347 63 98.8%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 30 483 167 98.8%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 50 528 181 99.2%
DFOc−CMA 30 475 225 99.2%
DFOc−CMA 50 491 246 99.4%
DFOd−DiagonalCMA 30 482 27 98.0%
DFOd−DiagonalCMA 50 510 37 98.0%
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D UNTARGETED ATTACKS WITH SMALLER NOISE INTENSITIES
We evaluated our method on smaller noise intensities ( ∈ {0.01, 0.03, 0.05}) in the untargeted
setting on ImageNet dataset. In this framework, we also picked up randomly 10, 000 images and
limited our budget to 10, 000 queries. We compared to the bandits method (Ilyas et al., 2018b) and
to the parsimonious attack (Moon et al., 2019) on InceptionV3 network. We limited our experiments
to a number of tiles of 50. We report our results in Table 4. We remark our attacks reach state of the
art for  = 0.03 and  = 0.05 both in terms of success rate and queries budget. For  = 0.01, we
reach results comparable to the state of the art.
Table 4: Results of our method compared to the parsimonious and bandit attacks in the un-
targeted setting on InceptionV3 pretrained network for different values of noise intensities  ∈
{0.01, 0.03, 0.05} and a maximum of 10, 000 queries.
 Method # of tiles Avg. queries Med. queries Success rate
0.05
Parsimonious - 722 237 98.5%
Bandits 50 995 249 95.1%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 50 510 63 97.3%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 50 623 191 98.7%
DFOc−CMA 50 630 259 99.2%
DFOd−DiagonalCMA 50 485 38 97.4%
0.03
Parsimonious - 1104 392 95.7%
Bandits 50 1376 466 92.7%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 50 846 203 93,2%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 50 971 429 96,5%
DFOc−CMA 50 911 404 96.7%
DFOd−DiagonalCMA 50 799 293 94,1%
0.01
Parsimonious - 2104 1174 80.3%
Bandits 50 2018 992 72.9%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 50 1668 751 72,1%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 50 1958 1175 79.2%
DFOc−CMA 50 1921 1107 80.4%
DFOd−DiagonalCMA 50 1188 849 71,3%
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E UNTARGETED ATTACKS AGAINST OTHER ARCHITECTURES
We also evaluated our method on different neural networks architectures. For each network we
randomly selected 10, 000 images that were correctly classified. We limit our budget to 10, 000
queries and set the number of tiles to 50. We achieve a success attack rate up to 100% on every
classifier with a budget as low as 8 median queries for the VGG16bn for instance (see Table 5). One
should notice that the performances are lower on InceptionV3 as it is also reported for the bandit
methods in (Ilyas et al., 2018b). This possibly due to the fact that the tiling trick is less relevant on
the Inception network than on the other networks (see Fig. 2).
Table 5: Comparison of our method on the ImageNet dataset with InceptionV3 (I), ResNet50 (R)
and VGG16bn (V) for  = 0.05 and 10, 000 as budget limit.
Method Tile size Avg queries Med. queries Succ. Rate
I R V I R V I R V
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 30 466 163 86 60 19 8 95.2% 99.6% 100%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 50 510 218 67 63 32 4 97.3% 99.6% 99.7%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 30 533 263 174 189 95 55 97.2% 99.0% 99.9%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 50 623 373 227 191 121 71 98.7% 99.9% 100%
DFOc−CMA 30 588 256 176 232 138 72 98.9% 99.9% 99.9%
DFOc−CMA 50 630 270 219 259 143 107 99.2% 100% 99.9%
DFOd−DiagonalCMA 50 485 617 345 38 62 6 97.4% 99.2% 99.6%
DFOd−DiagonalCMA 30 424 417 211 20 20 2 97.7% 98.8% 99.5%
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F TABLE FOR ATTACKS AGAINST ADVERSARIALLY TRANINED NETWORK
Table 6: Adversarial attacks against an adversarially trained WideResnet28x10 network on CI-
FAR10 dataset for  = 0.03125 and 20, 000 as budget limit.
Method # of tiles Average queries Median queries Success rate
PGD (not black-box) - 20 20 36%
Parsimonious - 1130 450 42%
Bandits 10 1429 530 29.1%
Bandits 20 1802 798 33.8%
Bandits 32 1993 812 34.8%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 10 429 60 29.5%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 20 902 93 30.5%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 32 1865 764 31.7%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 10 395 85 30.5%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 20 624 151 31.3%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 32 1379 860 34.7%
DFOc−CMA 10 363 156 30.4%
DFOc−CMA 20 1676 740 40.2%
DFOc−CMA 32 2311 1191 40.2%
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G FAILING METHODS
In this section, we compare our attacks to other optimization strategies. We run our experiments
in the same setup as in Section 4.3. Results are reported in Table 7. DE and Normal (1+1)-ES
performs poorly, probably because these optimization strategies converge slower when the optima
are at “infinity”. We reformulate this sentence accordingly in the updated version of the paper.
Finally, as the initialization of Powell is linear with the dimension and with less variance, it performs
poorer than simple random search. Newuoa, SQP and Cobyla algorithms have also been tried on
a smaller number images (we did not report the results), but their initialization is also linear in the
dimension, so they reach very poor results too.
Table 7: Comparison with other DFO optimization strategies in the untargeted setting on ImageNet
dataset InceptionV3 pretrained network for  = 0.05 and 10, 000 as budget limit.
Method # of tiles Average queries Median queries Success rate
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 30 466 60 95.2%
DFOc−Cauchy(1 + 1)-ES 50 510 63 97.3%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 30 533 189 97.2%
DFOc−DiagonalCMA 50 623 191 98.7%
DFOc−CMA 30 589 232 98.9%
DFOc−CMA 50 630 259 99.2%
DFOc−DE 30 756 159 78.8%
DFOc−DE 50 699 149 76.0%
DFOc−Normal(1 + 1)-ES 30 581 45 87.6%
DFOc−Normal(1 + 1)-ES 50 661 66 92.8%
DFOc−RandomSearch 30 568 6 37.9%
DFOc−RandomSearch 50 527 5 38.2%
DFOc−Powell 30 4889 5332 14.4%
DFOc−Powell 50 4578 4076 7.3%
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